



Annual Incident Reports 2016

Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector

JUNE 2017



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13

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39 Executive Summary

40 For the sixth year, ENISA publishes the annual report about significant outage incidents in the European electronic
41 communications sector, which are reported to ENISA and the European Commission under Article 13a of the
42 Framework Directive (2009/140/EC), by the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of the different EU Member
43 States.

44 This report covers the incidents that occurred in 2016 and it gives an aggregated analysis of the incident reports
45 about severe outages across the EU. This report does not include details about individual countries or providers.

46 The aim of the incident reporting scheme is to provide transparency to society and to learn from past incidents in
47 the electronic communications sector in order to systematically improve the security of the networks and services.
48 This report provides an overview on an aggregated level of what services and network assets are impacted and the
49 root causes of the incidents. Conclusions on the main patterns of incidents are drawn, contributing to discussions
50 at policy level on strategic measures to improve the security in the electronic communications sector.

51 The main conclusions from this year's incident reporting are the following:

- 52 • **158 major incidents reported:** This year 24 countries, including two EFTA countries, reported 158
53 significant incidents that occurred in 2016, while 6 countries reported they had no significant incidents.
54 102 incidents were above the informal EU thresholds.
- 55 • **Mobile internet most affected service:** In 2016 most incidents affected mobile internet (48% of all
56 reported incidents). Mobile internet and mobile telephony were the predominant affected services in the
57 previous years also, except for 2014 where fixed telephony was the most affected.
- 58 • **System failures are the dominant root cause of incidents:** Most incidents were caused by system failures
59 or technical failures (almost 73% of the incidents) as a root cause. This has been the dominant root cause
60 for all the reporting years so far. In the system failures root category, software bugs and hardware failures
61 were the most common causes affecting core network equipment.
- 62 • **System failures affected on average more user connections per incident:** In 2016 system failures was the
63 root cause category involving most users affected per incident (around 2 million user connections on
64 average per incident) . The second place was taken by malicious actions with 1.2 million user connections
65 on average per incident.
- 66 • **Malicious actions along with natural phenomena are not among the main root causes creating**
67 **disruptions:** the total number of incidents caused by malicious actions was 5.1%; double compared to
68 previous year (2.5% in 2015).
- 69 • **Malware caused the longest lasting incidents this year:** Incidents caused by malware (e.g. DDoS),
70 although we didn't have too many of them, had most impact in terms of duration and user hours lost.
- 71 • **Emergency services are affected by incidents:** Same as last year, 20 % of the incidents affected the 112
72 emergency services, a considerably high percentage.
- 73 • **Mobile base stations and controllers the most affected assets:** Overall, mobile base stations and controllers
74 and mobile switches were the network components most affected by incidents (7% and 6% respectively).

75 The analysis of annual incident reports the last six years has revealed specific trends and patterns of root causes,
76 detailed causes and affected services. These assets and threats need particular attention when carrying out risk
77 and vulnerability assessments in the electronic communications sector.

78 ENISA is permanently analysing the current threat environment and develops projects that address particular
79 technical or policy related topics directly linked to the electronic communications sector. In the context of Article13a
80 efforts, ENISA has been conducting many supporting activities in order to provide a holistic and in-depth view to
81 providers that need to assess risks, take appropriate security measures, and report about significant security
82 incidents.

83 Based on the annual summary reporting of previous years, ENISA analysed **power supply dependencies**, and issued
84 recommendations regarding the sector's ability to withstand and act efficiently after power cuts. ENISA also studied
85 in 2013 **national roaming for increased resilience in mobile networks**. Last year, based on the annual summary
86 reporting of 2012 and 2013 incidents, ENISA has issued **recommendations for providers** about how to manage
87 security requirements for vendors of ICT equipment and outsourced services used for core operations. Based on the
88 2012 and 2013 summary reporting ENISA has also studied **national initiatives to reduce the number of underground
89 cable breaks caused by mistakes**.

90 ENISA has developed studies in order to facilitate NRAs as well as telco providers to incorporate these
91 recommendations to their security activities. Recently developed a study on **security measures implemented by
92 electronic communication providers**, and **alternative indicators for measuring impact in electronic communications
93 services**.

94 Furthermore, in 2015, ENISA developed an **impact evaluation of the Art. 13a provisions**, with the purpose of
95 assessing the changes in outcome that can directly be attributed to the article, the effects caused by this particular
96 set of obligations within the Telecom Package.

97

1. Introduction

98 The current document represents the sixth iteration of the report “Annual Incident Reports”, which summarises
99 significant outage incidents in the telecom sector reported to ENISA and the European Commission (EC), under
100 Article 13a of the **Framework Directive (2009/140/EC)**, an article introduced in the 2009 reform of the **EU**
101 **regulatory framework for electronic communications**. This year ENISA and EC received 158 incident reports from
102 NRAs, about severe outages in the EU’s electronic communication networks and/or services which occurred in
103 2016. This report provides an aggregate analysis of these 158 incidents.

104 Please note that in this document we do *not* provide details from the individual incident reports. The analysis is
105 only an aggregation in terms of averages and percentages across the EU and EFTA countries, and it does not
106 contain references to specific countries or specific providers. Individual incidents are discussed in more detail with
107 the NRAs in the **Article 13a Expert Group**.

108 This document is structured as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 briefly summarize Article 13a and the details of the
109 technical implementation of Article 13a, as agreed in the Article 13a Expert Group by the different NRAs of the EU
110 Member States. Section 4 analyses the incidents from 2016 which were reported to ENISA and the Commission
111 and provides examples of incidents. Section 5 provides the conclusions.

112 In the separate document of Annex (Annexes A-D) we show graphs with the trend over the years to allow for the
113 reader to make a comparison with data from previous years. This comparison should however be done with
114 caution, as the methodology for details in the reporting has been improved over the years and the thresholds have
115 been lowered year by year allowing for more incidents to be reported.

116

2. Article 13a of the Framework Directive: ‘Security and Integrity’

The reform of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, which was adopted in 2009 and was transposed by most EU countries around May 2011, added Article 13a to the Framework Directive. Article 13a addresses the security and integrity¹ of public electronic communications networks and services. The legislation concerns National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and providers of public electronic communications networks and services (providers).

Article 13a states:

- Providers of public electronic communications networks and services should take measures to guarantee security and integrity of their networks.
- Providers must notify competent national authorities about breaches of security or loss of integrity that have had significant impact on the operation of networks or services.
- National Regulatory Authorities should notify ENISA and national authorities abroad when necessary, for example in case of incidents with cross-border impact.
- Annually, National Regulatory Authorities should submit a summary report to ENISA and the European Commission about the incidents.

These incident reporting flows (incident notification and annual reporting) are shown in the diagram below. This document analyses the incidents from 2015 that have been reported to ENISA (the black dashed arrow).




Figure 1: Incident reporting in Article 13a

Late 2015 the European Commission has started the process of revising the regulatory framework on electronic communications in order to “assess the current rules and to seek views on possible adaptations to the framework in light of market and technological developments, with the objective of contributing to the Digital Single Market Strategy”². A public consultation concerning the evaluation and review of the current regulatory framework was ended in December 2015. In this context, ENISA along with the Article 13a Expert Group submitted an opinion on the evaluation and review of Article 13a and 13b of the Framework Directive, area which is at the core of ENISA expertise and competence. A draft of the new regulatory framework is expected until the end of the year.

¹ Here integrity means network integrity, which is often called availability or continuity in information security literature.

²<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-evaluation-and-review-regulatory-framework-electronic-communications>

3. Article 13a Expert Group and Incident Reporting Procedure

In 2010, ENISA, Ministries and NRAs initiated a series of meetings (workshops, conference calls) to achieve a harmonised implementation of Article 13a of the **Framework directive**. In these meetings, a group of experts from NRAs, called **the Article 13a Expert Group**, reached agreement on two non-binding technical documents providing guidance to the NRAs in the EU Member States:

- **Technical Guideline on Incident Reporting**³
- **Technical Guideline on Security Measures**⁴

Later on, in 2014, the group of experts agreed on the third non-binding technical document:

- **Technical Guideline on Threats and Assets**⁵.

The Article 13a Expert Group continues to meet several times a year to develop the technical guidelines and to discuss the implementation of Article 13a (for example, on how to supervise the electronic communications sector) and to share knowledge and exchange views about past incidents, and how to address them.

3.1 Incident reporting procedure

In spring 2012, the EC agreed with the EU Member States (in meetings of the Communications Committee, COCOM) to do the first round of annual summary reporting on the 2011 incidents impacting the continuity of supply of electronic communications services. The decision included a recommendation to use the reporting template agreed within the **Article 13a Expert Group** and published by ENISA. Following the COCOM meeting, ENISA implemented the technical procedure by deploying a basic electronic form based on the **Article 13a Technical Guideline on Incident Reporting**. There was also an agreement that in the coming years, annual reporting would be carried out by the end of February each year.

In autumn 2012, ENISA developed an online incident reporting tool (called CIRAS), which replaces the electronic forms exchanged by email. CIRAS allows NRAs to exert greater control over the data reported and provides the NRAs with better access to data about incidents reported across the EU. Since 2015 ENISA is providing the possibility for the NRAs to extract graphs from CIRAS based on their search results.

We briefly explain the main features of the incident reporting procedure, as described in the **Article 13a Technical Guideline on Incident Reporting**, which was developed in collaboration with the NRAs.

3.1.1 Services in scope

Although the focus of this report is still on the main 4 types of classic services, due to latest technological and legal advancements, we have decided to extend the number of services. As some of those services become more and more important in nowadays EU digital market, and some countries already cover them through their national level regulations, their inclusion in ENISA's annual report is a must as preparatory work needs to be done to cover them in the future.

³ <https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13/guideline-for-incident-reporting>

⁴ <https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13/guideline-for-minimum-security-measures>

⁵ https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13/guideline_on_threats_and_assets

176 Besides the four main services (aka. classic services), others were added as follows:

CLASSIC SERVICES	OTHER SERVICES (SINCE 2016)
Fixed telephony	SMS
Mobile telephony	MMS
Fixed Internet access	Satellite TV
Mobile Internet access	International roaming
	RADIO broadcasting
	TV broadcasting
	Cable TV
	IPTV
	Video on demand
	Public WIFI
	Web based voice services
	Web-based messaging services
	Public email services

177 **Table 1: Services in scope**

178 **3.1.2 Security incidents in scope**

179 NRAs should report security incidents, which had a significant impact on the continuity of supply of electronic
 180 communications services. As explained, not all incidents types are reportable under Art. 13a provisions. Depending
 181 on the national implementation of Art. 13a, if one incident does not affect the continuity of the service
 182 (availability), although confidentiality or integrity might be affected, the incident needs no reporting.

183 **3.1.3 National user base**

184 NRAs should provide estimates of the total number of users of each service in their country. The national user base
 185 is used for determining the significance of incidents, in cases where the threshold is relative to the national user
 186 base.

- 187 • For fixed telephony and Internet, NRAs should use the number of subscribers or access lines in their
 188 country.
- 189 • For mobile telephony, NRAs should use the number of active telephony SIM cards.
- 190 • For mobile Internet, NRAs should sum up⁶:
 - 191 1. The number of standard mobile subscriptions, which offer both telephony and Internet access, and
 192 which have been used for Internet access recently (e.g. in the past 3 months).
 - 193 2. The number of subscriptions dedicated for mobile Internet access, which are purchased
 194 separately, either standalone or on top of an existing voice subscription.
- 195 • For other types of services that are still in an experimental phase no national user base was collected at
 196 this point.

197 **3.1.4 Thresholds**

198 **NOTE:** Art. 13a provisions state that Member States (MS) shall ensure that electronic communication providers will
 199 “notify the competent national regulatory authority of a breach of security or loss of integrity that has had a

⁶ Reference is made to the definition agreed in the COCOM meetings.

200 *significant impact on the operation of networks or services". However, the thresholds for defining significant incidents*
 201 *were not established through the Directive and the EC has not issued any implementing measures in this sense leaving*
 202 *the matter open for discussions and unrestricted for national implementation. At this point the activities of ENISA*
 203 *and Art. 13a expert group have proved to be very useful by defining a set of **informal and non-binding EU thresholds***
 204 *to help Member States in reporting or setting up their own national level thresholds. In this respect a set of EU*
 205 *thresholds were adopted by the Art. 13a expert group that are known and accepted by every country, but it has*
 206 *remained at the discretion of each Member State to adopt its own national thresholds. All incidents reported within*
 207 *the annual report to ENISA and EC, and presented within this report, are based on the thresholds established at*
 208 *national levels, which can be above or below (in most of the cases they are below) the EU thresholds. For an analysis*
 209 *of incidents based on the informal EU level thresholds pls. see [Section 4.5](#).*

210 The EU thresholds for the annual summary reporting are based on the duration and the number of users of a service
 211 affected as a percentage of the national user base of the service.

212 NRAs should send an incident report, as part of the annual summary reporting, if the incident:

- 213 • lasts more than an hour, and the percentage of users affected is higher than 15 %,
- 214 • lasts more than 2 hours, and the percentage of users affected is higher than 10 %,
- 215 • lasts more than 4 hours, and the percentage of users affected is higher than 5 %,
- 216 • lasts more than 6 hours, and the percentage of users affected is higher than 2 %, or if it
- 217 • lasts more than 8 hours, and the percentage of users affected is higher than 1 %.

	1h<...<2h	2h<...<4h	4h<...<6h	6h<...<8h	>8h
1%<...< 2% of user base					
2%<...< 5% of user base					
5%<...< 10% of user base					
10%<...< 15% of user base					
> 15% of user base					

218 **Table 2: Threshold for annual summary reporting based on a combination of duration and the percentage of the national user base.**

219 The threshold should be understood on a “per service” basis. In other words, if an incident impacts multiple
 220 services, then for one of the services the threshold should be passed in order to trigger the reporting mechanism.
 221 NRAs have the discretion to also report incidents with impact graded below the threshold.

222 Since 2013, we introduced a new optional threshold for annual summary reporting, based on absolute impact, in
 223 order to allow for NRAs in large Member States to include larger incidents but that would not exceed the relative
 224 thresholds. This absolute threshold has been lowered for 2014 and has now become mandatory. NRAs should
 225 include incidents when the product of duration and number of user connections affected exceeds **60 million user**
 226 **minutes, or 1 million user hours**. Note that the introduction of this mandatory and lowered absolute threshold has
 227 led to an increase in the number of reported incidents to ENISA and the Commission.

228 In case of the services that deviate from the four main services no thresholds were established. Member states
 229 could report incidents that they consider significant.

3.1.5 EU thresholds vs. national level thresholds

Art. 13a provisions state that member states shall ensure that electronic communication providers will “notify the competent national regulatory authority of a breach of security or loss of integrity that has had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services”. But the thresholds for defining significant incidents were not established through the Directive and the EC has not issued any implementing measures in this sense leaving the matter open for discussions and unrestricted as regards the national implementation. At this point the activities of ENISA and Art. 13a expert group have proved to be very useful by defining a set of **informal and non-binding EU thresholds** to help member states in reporting or setting up their own national level thresholds. In this respect a set of EU thresholds were adopted by the Art. 13a expert group that are known and accepted by every country, but it has remained at the discretion of each Member State to adopt its own national thresholds. All incidents reported within the annual report to ENISA and EC, and presented within this report, are based on the thresholds established at national levels, which can be above or below (in most of the cases they are below) the EU thresholds. This section presents a short analysis of incidents based on the informal EU level thresholds.




Figure 2: Total incidents in annual reports vs. Total incidents above thresholds

According to our estimations more than half of the EU member states have thresholds below the ones defined by ENISA while others use the same thresholds.

3.1.6 Root cause categories

In the incident reports four categories of root causes have been outlined plus one category that is used in conjunction with one of the other four categories.

- **Natural phenomena** – This category includes incidents caused by severe weather, earthquakes, floods, pandemic diseases, wildfires, wildlife, and so on.
- **Human errors** - This category includes incidents caused by errors committed by employees of the provider or outside the provider, during the operation of equipment or facilities, the use of tools, the execution of procedures, etc. E.g. an excavator cutting off a cable.
- **Malicious attacks** - This category includes incidents caused by a deliberate act by someone or some organisation, e.g. a Denial of Service attack disrupting the service, or a cable theft.
- **System failures** – This category includes incidents caused by technical failures of a system, for example caused by hardware failures, software bugs or flaws in manuals, procedures or policies.
- **Third party failures** – This category includes incidents caused by a failure or incident at a third party. The category is used in conjunctions with one of the other four root cause categories.

3.1.7 Detailed causes

In the incident reports, detailed causes are specified in terms of “initial cause” and “subsequent cause”. “Initial cause” is the event or factor that *triggered* the incident. Often incidents involve a chain of events or factors, and by specifying a “subsequent cause” NRAs may indicate a cause that subsequently played a role in the incident. In the ENISA annual reports the initial and subsequent causes are equally presented in the graphs of the detailed causes. These detailed causes are referred to as “threats” in the [Article 13a Technical Guideline on Threats and Assets](#)⁷. In the report, which is used by the NRAs as a guide for the annual summary reporting, the causes/threats are listed and described.

3.1.8 Assets affected

Optionally NRAs may indicate what network assets were affected by the incidents, e.g. HLRs, routers and switches, underground cables etc. These assets are listed and described in the [Article 13a Technical Guideline on Threats and Assets](#).

3.1.9 Impact evaluation on the implementation of Article 13a incident reporting scheme

As several years have passed since the publication and implementation of the Framework Directive including Art. 13a, an impact evaluation of the new article was the proper thing to do. This was done by ENISA along with the [Article 13a Expert Group](#) in 2015. The evaluation had the purpose of assessing the changes in outcome that can directly be attributed to the provision of Art. 13a, the effects caused by this particular set of obligations within the Telecom Package. The evaluation focused on 5 key areas, where we tried to identify possible outcomes:

- The new security measures implemented in the member states;
- The transparency resulting from the incident reporting process;
- The learning process resulting from incidents;
- The level of collaboration between the stakeholders;
- The harmonization of the procedures within the European Union.

The compendious evaluation done within this project has brought to light some important outcomes that have definitely contributed to increasing the resilience and security of the telecommunications infrastructures in Europe. In a European Union which was highly diversified in terms of security measures, Art. 13a brought a certain amount of uniformity in the approach taken regarding security of telecommunication services, but more importantly contributed to strengthening the European telecom infrastructure’s resilience and services availability across the EU. The role of ENISA, especially in the coordination of Art. 13a expert group, was most beneficial as it helped considerably in bringing more harmonization within the implementation process and collaboration among stakeholders (NRAs and providers). The report has served as an input to the EU Commission in the telecom framework evaluation process. The full report along with findings and conclusions can be found [here](#).

⁷ https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13/guideline_on_threats_and_assets

4. Analysis of the incidents

In total, all 28 EU Member States and 2 EFTA country participated in this process. Of these, 22 Member States and 2 EFTA countries reported in total 158 significant incidents and 6 countries reported there were no significant incidents. An increase from previous year where we had 21 countries reporting significant incidents.



Figure 3: Countries involved in the annual summary reporting in 2015.

In this section, the 158 reported incidents are aggregated and analysed. First, the impact per service is analysed (in Section 4.1), then the impact per root cause category is analysed (Section 4.2), and in Section 4.3 detailed causes are examined. In Section 4.3.5 the impact, as a product of user connections affected and duration of the incidents, is analysed, and in Section 4.4 the components or assets affected by the incidents are considered. Throughout the text we provide anonymized descriptions (in blue italic) of actual large-scale incidents which occurred in 2015. In annex A-D we show graphs including the previous two years to allow the reader to make a comparison. This comparison should however be done with caution, see below.

Note about statistical conclusions: Readers should be cautious when drawing conclusions from the statistics in this report. In particular, they should take into account that:

1. The scope of reporting major security incidents is restricted to incidents with an impact on the *continuity* of public electronic communication services and networks. There are many other types of incidents with an impact on security of services and networks which are not in scope of annual reporting. For example, if attackers would wiretap undersea cables without causing any outages, then such a security incident would not be included in the annual reporting.
2. The scope of reporting includes major, or *significant*, incidents scoring above the agreed reporting thresholds. Smaller incidents are not reported at EU level, meaning that the view is skewed towards the larger incidents.
3. Year by year we are in collaboration with the NRAs and in some cases the thresholds that define the significance of incidents are modified. This may cause the number of reported incidents to fluctuate. Until now the thresholds have only been lowered, causing in some years an increase in the number of incidents. This doesn't necessarily mean that the number of incidents throughout the EU is increasing.
4. We are continuously working in collaboration with the NRAs for improved quality in the incident reporting. There are still changes, more details and improvements in the way national and EU reporting is being implemented, including the lowering of reporting thresholds and refinements of parameters for reporting. Statistical conclusions about multi-annual trends should therefore **be drawn with caution**.


324 5. All incidents reported within the annual report to ENISA and EC, and presented within this report, are based
 325 on the thresholds established at national levels, which can be above or below (in most of the cases they are
 326 below) the EU thresholds. For an analysis of incidents based on the informal EU level thresholds pls. see
 327 [Section 4.5.](#)

328 4.1 Impact of incidents

329 First we look at the electronic communications services and compare them with each other in terms of incidents.

330 4.1.1 Impact per service

331 For third year in a row most of the reported incidents affected mobile internet. Both mobile internet and mobile
 332 telephony services had an increase on incidents compared to last year's results. In 2014 the most affected service
 333 was fixed telephony (see Annex A).



334 **Figure 4: Incidents per classic services (percentage)**

335
 336
 337 Note that most reported incidents usually have an impact on more than one service in the same incident (which is
 338 why the percentages in the chart add up to more than 100 %).

339 **A system failure affected mobile internet to fail for millions of users (duration: hours, connections: millions, cause: software bug):** Software bug occurred in the Internal system component SDM leading to the degradation of
 340 user authorization mobile data and mobile voice. As a result end users had difficulties to access mobile services,
 341 both voice and data locally and also abroad (roaming services). Mobile switches and mobile user registerss were
 342 affected by this bug. Provider removed the obstacles in accessing the services and for the prevention of similar
 343 incidents in the future, a mitigation plan was created in collaboration with software vendors.
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Other services

Apart from the four main services, the most affected services are SMS (16,5), Cable TV (7,6%) and MMS (7%).




Figure 5: Incidents per other service (percentage)

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4.1.2 Number of user connections affected

Mobile Internet outages affected most user connections compared to the other services, with an average of 1.3 million user connections affected per reported incident. Also in past reporting years' mobile internet failures affected most user connections, and mobile telephony failures came in second place, see Annex A.




Figure 6: Average number of user connections affected per incident per classic service (1000s).

Note that the averages in these diagrams include both small and large countries, so EU averages shown in the diagram above are not necessarily representative for the size of incidents occurring nationally. The average size of

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356 national incidents can be very different, depending on the size of the population and the national network
 357 topology. What is interesting to note is the comparison between the affected services in terms of affected user
 358 connections.

359 The evolution of the number of affected connections can be seen in Annex A.

Other services

The average number of connections affected for Radio broadcasting is 2 million. As for MMS (1.3 million) and SMS (1.2 million) services is in the same range as mobile telephony/mobile internet underlining the interconnection between the two.




Figure 7: Average number of user connections affected (1000s) - other services

360 **4.1.3 Percentage of the national user base affected**

361 Mobile Internet outages impacted on average 14% of the national user base for mobile Internet user connections,
 362 which is a slight increase compared to the previous years, see annex A.3. All five years, mobile Internet has been
 363 reported to suffer the most impact in terms of percentage of its national user base compared to the other services.





Figure 8: Percentage of national user base affected on average per incident per service.

364
 365

366

367 4.1.4 Impact on emergency services


368 In more than 20% of incidents reported, emergency calls were impacted - i.e. the possibility for users to contact
369 emergency call-centres using the emergency number 112.



370 Figure 9: Impact on emergency calls.

372 4.1.5 Impact on interconnections

373 In 7 % of incidents reported there was an impact on interconnections between providers. Compared to previous
374 year also this figure has a decrease, see Annex A.



375 Figure 10: Impact on interconnections (percentage)

4.2 Root cause categories

In this section we look at the main root cause categories of reported incidents. For a description of the root cause categories, see section 3.1.5.

4.2.1 Incidents per root cause category

This year almost 73% of the reported incidents were caused by system failures or technical failures, a ratio which is consistent compared to all the previous years, see Annex B. For all reporting years, system failures has been the most commonly impacted root cause category. In second place, for this year is root cause of human errors 11,4% of the reported incidents, also consistent with previous years. Malicious actions and natural phenomena caused the least of the incidents (both with 5,1%).



Figure 11: Incidents per root cause category (percentage).

System failure caused disruption in all classic services and SMS/ MMS services affecting millions of users (duration: hours, connections: millions, cause: hardware failure): System failure caused outage of network components using technology for DSL in the subscriber access network. Provider raised the capacities of network components in order to provide electronic communications service. As a next step a software upgrade of several selected network components was applied.

4.2.2 Third party failures

About 21.5% of the incidents reported were categorized as third party failures, a significant increase compared to the previous year (14.8%), see Annex B.



Figure 12: Third party failures and non-third party failures of all incidents (percentages).

4.2.3 Root cause categories per service

In this section we look at the root causes for each of the four services separately: fixed telephony, fixed Internet access, mobile telephony and mobile Internet access.

As in 2015, also in 2016, system failures was the dominant root cause for all services respectively, counting in all cases for more than half of the incidents reported. For mobile telephony and mobile internet, this was the case also in the previous years, whereas the dominant root cause for fixed telephony and fixed internet oscillated in the previous years between natural phenomena and system failures, see Annex B.

4.2.3.1 Fixed Telephony



Figure 13: Root cause categories for fixed telephony (percentage).

4.2.3.2 Fixed Internet



Figure 14: Root cause categories for fixed Internet (percentage).

412 4.2.3.3 Mobile telephony



413

414

Figure 15: Root cause categories for mobile telephony (percentage).

415

416

417 4.2.3.4 Mobile internet



418

419

Figure 16: Root cause categories for mobile Internet (percentage).


420 4.2.3.5 Other services

System failures is also the main root cause for other services besides the classic services, with a percentage of approximately 71%.



Figure 17: Root cause categories for other services (percentage).


421 **4.2.4 Average number of user connections affected per root cause category**
 422 Also this year, system failures affected most user connections, on average about 2.0 million user connections per
 423 incident. In the previous year, system failures affected on average 1.6 million user connections.



424
425
426

Figure 18: Average number of user connections affected per incident per root cause (1000s)

427 **4.2.5 Average duration of incidents per root cause category**
 428 The reported incidents caused by natural phenomena had the longest recovery time on average per incident (400
 429 hours). Excluding last year's result where malicious action was the root cause with the longest incidents on
 430 average, natural phenomena tend to cause the longest incidents in terms of duration. For the evolution in time of
 431 the average duration pls. check Annex B.




432
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434
435

Figure 19: Average duration of incidents per root cause category (hours).

436 4.2.6 User hours lost per root cause category

437



438

439

440

Figure 20: User hours lost per root cause category (hours).

4.3 Detailed causes

Root cause categories are rather broad but give a good summary of the most common types of incidents. In this section we break down the root cause categories in predefined detailed causes of incidents.

An incident is often not only triggered by one cause but often by multiple causes and a chain of causes. For instance, an incident may initially be triggered by heavy winds, which tear down power supply infrastructure causing a power cut, which in turn leads to an outage. For this incident both heavy winds and power cut are detailed causes. These detailed causes are equally represented in the statistics, because both causes may be addressed by the provider in terms of security measures.

4.3.1 Detailed causes of all incidents

In 2016, the most common causes of incidents were hardware failures and software bugs. This can now be considered a trend as this has been the case all the previous years, with the first position being occupied by one or the other. Also power cuts and cable cuts seem to slightly decrease and leave their place from the top four causes of the last four years. Many detailed causes of incidents reports do not fall under a specific category and form the category of "Other" which has a significant position in the overall chart. However, analysing further these detailed causes we see that most of them describe a cause that resulted to a system failure. Even though most of the causes in Other category in generic terms fall either under Software bug or Faulty software change/update, we detail some that seem interesting: billing platform failure, connectivity failure, maintenance, scheduled work failure, STP error, redundancy failure, etc.




Figure 21: Detailed causes of reported incidents (percentage)

Hardware failure resulted to unavailability of services for more than a million of users (duration: hours, connections: millions, causes: system failure): Outage of network components using technology for DSL in the subscriber access network resulted to disruption of all classic services as well as SMS and MMS services. Provider responded to the incident by raising the capacities of network components in order to provide electronic communications service. Followed a software upgrade of several selected network components to resolve the issue completely.

470 **4.3.2 Detailed causes per service**

471 In this section we show the detailed causes of incidents for each of the main four services (fixed telephony, fixed
472 Internet, mobile telephony and mobile Internet) and for the other services. As in the previous year, also this year,
473 Hardware failures were the most common causes for failures in all the main four services and for the other
474 services as well.

475 **4.3.2.1 Fixed Telephony**




Figure 22: Detailed causes for fixed telephony (percentage).

479 **4.3.2.2 Fixed Internet**






Figure 23: Detailed causes for fixed Internet (percentage).

481 4.3.2.3 Mobile Telephony



482 Figure 24: Detailed causes for mobile telephony (percentage).

483 4.3.2.4 Mobile Internet



484 Figure 25: Detailed causes for mobile Internet (percentage).

485 4.3.2.5 Other services

486 More than 50% of the incidents affecting other services, except the four main services, were caused by Hardware failures, Power cuts and Cable cuts, with 26%, 16% and 12% respectively. Cable cuts and Software bugs had the same percentage in this case.




Figure 26: Detailed causes for other services (percentage).

490 4.3.2.6 Average number of user connections affected per detailed cause category





Figure 27: Average number of user connections affected per detailed cause (hours).


491

492 4.3.3 Average duration of incidents per detailed cause category



493
494 Figure 28: Average duration of incidents per detailed cause category (hours).
495

496 4.3.4 User hours lost per detailed service



497
498 Figure 29: User hours lost per detailed cause (hours).
499

500 **An attempt of malware infention coming from a malicious action caused outage on fixed internet, fixed**
501 **telephony, IPTV and DNS services for more than three days: (duration: days, connections: thousands, cause:**
502 **Malicious action):** A worldwide attack of a botnet attempted to infect maintenance interfaces of customer premises
503 equipments with a malware. This attempt failed but caused a restricted access to electronic communications
504 services. Provider mitigated this attack by implementing filtering measures in order to prevent further malicious
505 attacks of this kind. Provider updated remotely the firmware in customer premises equipments (CPEs) and asked
affected customers to disconnect CPEs from the power supply, and switch them on in order to finalise the update.

4.4 Analysis of arising cybersecurity trends/issues

For the reporting years 2012-2016, annual reports included in total 614 incident reports with 425 incident reports (69% of total incident reports) coming from system failures. On the other side, only 34 incident reports (5,5% of total incident reports) are a result of malicious actions. Approximately 76,5% of the malicious actions consist of cybersecurity attacks, namely Denial of Service attacks, malware / viruses and network hijacks, while the rest concern deliberate damages to physical infrastructure. At this point, we need to stress that during all the reporting years only 3 reported incidents were caused by malware. The proportion of malicious actions (especially cybersecurity related incidents) among the total number of incidents reported remains low due to the focus of the current regulation on the “availability” of services and networks, meaning mostly disruptions.

Considering the above we may conclude that malicious actions (especially cyber-attacks) are not necessarily focused on creating disruptions in Telecom, conclusion that has already been presented in previous versions of this report. But, what we also can conclude is that, under the current form of Art. 13a within the Electronic Telecommunication Framework Directive, we do not have a very good overview of the cyber-attacks affecting the telecommunication infrastructure in EU. Although the present incident reporting scheme currently does not allow us to see the whole picture, external sources (public reports, statistics, online articles etc.) on Telecom incidents confirm an increasing trend as regards cyber-attacks. According to PwC’s Global State of Information Security, 2016⁸, IT security incidents in the telecom sector increased 45% in 2015 compared to the year before.

However, for the first time in the six year’s analysis of annual incident reports we see malware as the detailed cause, with the most impact in terms of average duration and user hours lost. Interestingly, the same terms of impact were trending in last year’s report but for root cause of malicious actions. It is of high importance to underline that cybersecurity related detailed causes appeared to result the most user hours lost for both years of 2015 and 2016.

According to Gartner, 8.4 billion connected things will be in use worldwide in 2017, an increase of 31 percent compared to 2016, and it is estimated that connected devices will reach 20.4 billion by 2020. The increasing spread of digital technologies, the burst of emerging technologies, such as Software Defined Networks (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and IoT can lead to a growth in the number of cybersecurity attacks. The DSM strategy⁹ recognizes the importance of the paradigm shifts the digital sector is undergoing and aims to tackle regulatory fragmentation and build a more effective regulatory institutional framework.

In the light of the DSM strategy for Europe and based on the objective of ensuring a high-level of security of networks and services in telecommunication, the European Commission has drafted a new **Proposal for the European Electronic Communications Code**. The new proposal of EECC will extend the incident reporting mechanism and will cover the entire threat landscape of telecommunications in EU by introducing:

a) a comprehensive definition of security in telecom. The revised definition of security puts in scope, apart from the availability, also the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of services and networks.

b) a wider scope to include also number-independent interpersonal communications services (also called OTTs), and

⁸ <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cyber-security/information-security-survey.html>

⁹ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/digital-single-market-commission-calls-swift-adoption-key-proposals-and-maps-out-challenges>

540 c) new parameters for measuring significance of incidents. Parameters to determine significant incidents, expand
541 from user connections affected by the breach and duration of the breach, also to geographical spread, the extent to
542 which the functioning service is disrupted, and to societal and economic impact.

543 The new EECC is expected to be adopted in 2018.

544 Additionally, regulations with substantial improvements on security that facilitate the coverage of the entire
545 spectrum of the rapidly changing digital society have been adopted recently.

546 NIS Directive and GDPR will affect the regulatory obligations in the Telecom sector posing new procedures and more
547 dimensions of information security compliance. The NIS Directive will introduce new requirements in the area of
548 security measures and incident notification for Digital Service Providers (DSP) and Essential Services Operators (ESO).
549 NIS Directive and the new EECC converge on the incident reporting as many cloud services of DSPs and digital
550 infrastructure of ESOs share common resources coming from telecom providers.

551 The ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR, which provide together the legal framework to ensure digital privacy for EU
552 citizens, will also affect the electronic communications sector.

553 The harmonisation level between all relevant security related EU level regulations has certainly increased in recent
554 years. The providers will have to consider all these three legal acts when building their cyber security and compliance
555 policies.

556

4.5 Assets affected

Also this year we received reports from NRAs about which components or assets of the electronic communications networks were affected by the incidents. This provides some more information about the nature of the outages and what assets of the infrastructure that were primarily involved in them.

4.5.1 Assets affected overall

In 2016, mobile base stations and controllers, mobile switches and switches and routers were the assets most affected by incidents. For more details on the timeline of assets affected please see Annex D.




Figure 30: Assets affected by the incidents (percentage).

4.5.2 Affected assets in system failures

As for all previous reporting years, system failures (or technical failures), was the most common root cause category in 2016. In these system failures, the most common assets that failed were mobile switches, switches and routers and other uncategorised assets. Also the previous year mobile switches, and switches and routers were the most common assets to fail in this root cause category.




Figure 31: Assets affected by system failures (percentages).

573

5. Conclusions

574 In this report ENISA summarized and analysed the outage incidents that were sent by the National Regulatory
575 Authorities (NRAs) from member states and EFTA countries, to ENISA and the European Commission in 2017
576 concerning incidents in 2016, as mandated by Article 13a of the [Framework Directive \(2009/140/EC\)](#).

577 In 2016, analysing the **158 significant** incidents reported to ENISA and the EU Commission, the following conclusions
578 can be drawn, first looking at services and network assets affected and then at the causes of the incidents.

- 579 • **Mobile internet remains the most affected service:** In 2016 most incidents affected mobile internet (48%
580 of all reported incidents). Mobile internet and mobile telephony were the predominant affected services in
581 the previous years also, except for 2014 where fixed telephony was the most affected.
- 582 • **Mobile services outages have affected in average more users than other:** Incidents affecting mobile
583 Internet or mobile telephony affected most users (around 1.3 million users and 1.1 million users
584 respectively per incident). On average 14% of national user base was affected by incidents on mobile
585 internet services.
- 586 • **System failures are the dominant root cause of incidents affecting availability:** Most incidents were caused
587 by system failures or technical failures (more than 70 % of the incidents) as a root cause. This has been the
588 dominant root cause for all the reporting years so far. System failures was also the most common root cause
589 for all the main services when looking at them separately and also the main root cause for all services, both
590 classic and other services. In the system failures category, software bugs and hardware failures were the
591 most common causes. The assets most often affected by system failures were switches and routers, and
592 mobile base stations.
- 593 • **Third party failures continue to affect a considerable part of the total number of incidents:** 21.5% of all
594 incidents were caused by third party failures, a significant increase from last year (15,2%). Third party
595 failure incidents are of high importance as they represent incidents completely out of the control of the
596 provider. Therefore, such kind of incidents are complex and difficult to tackle. System failures followed by
597 human errors were the most common cause category for third party failures also.
- 598 • **Malware is causing increasingly long lasting incidents:** In last year's analysis incidents caused by malicious
599 actions (e.g. malware and DDoS), although we didn't have too many of them, had most impact in terms of
600 duration. This year, a single incident of malware caused the most impact in terms of average duration and
601 user-hours lost. This change is strongly related to large DDoS attacks of last year. Last 2 years of reporting
602 have certainly showed that cyber-attacks can also aim at creating long lasting disruptions in Telecom.

603 As the legal landscape affecting the Telecom industry has undergone recent updates, it is our opinion that the new
604 improvements will certainly contribute to a more secured and harmonised telecommunications environment
605 across Europe¹⁰. Covering a wider range of threats and types of incidents that can affect telecommunications can
606 be key in better understanding the challenges within the sector, and dealing with their main causes. The electronic
607 telecommunication industry has reached a certain level of maturity among other IT related sectors, but the threat
608 level is still high, maintained by the importance of the sector, as an infrastructure provider for the digital economy.

¹⁰ <https://www.dotmagazine.online/issues/connecting-the-world-whats-it-worth/challenges-in-eu-telecom-security>

609 ENISA, in the context of the **Article 13a Expert** Group, will continue discussing specific incidents in more detail with
610 the NRAs, and if needed, discuss and agree on mitigating measures. ENISA will also continue to give support to other
611 sectors that are developing network and information security incident reporting schemes.

612 ENISA would like to take this opportunity to thank the NRAs, Ministries and the European Commission for a fruitful
613 collaboration and we look forward to leveraging this kind of reporting to further improve the security and resilience
614 of the electronic communications sector in the EU and more generally for supervision of security also in other critical
615 sectors.

616

617

618 References

619 Related ENISA papers

- 620 • ENISA's reports about the 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 incidents, reported under Article 13a:
621 <http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/annual-reports>
- 622 • ENISA's study "Impact evaluation on the implementation of Article 13a incident reporting scheme within
623 EU": <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/impact-evaluation-article13a>
- 624 • The Article 13a Expert Group technical guidelines on incident reporting, security measures, and threats
625 and assets respectively: <https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/article-13>
- 626 • ENISA's study 2013 on Power Supply Dependencies in the Electronic Communications Sector:
627 [http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/power-supply-](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/power-supply-dependencies)
628 [dependencies](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/power-supply-dependencies)
- 629 • ENISA's study 2013 on National Roaming for Resilience: [http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/national-roaming-for-resilience)
630 [and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/national-roaming-for-resilience](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/national-roaming-for-resilience)
- 631 • ENISA's study and guide 2014 to Electronic Communications Providers when procuring ICT products and
632 outsourced services for core operations: [https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/requirements-ecomms-vendors)
633 [CIIP/Incidents-reporting/requirements-ecomms-vendors](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/requirements-ecomms-vendors)
- 634 • ENISA's study 2014 on information sharing systems for announcing civil works in order to protect
635 underground communications infrastructure from cable cuts:
636 [https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/protection-of-](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/protection-of-underground-infrastructure)
637 [underground-infrastructure](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/protection-of-underground-infrastructure)
- 638 • ENISA's whitepaper from 2012 on cyber incident reporting in the EU shows Article 13a and how it
639 compares to some other security articles mandating incident reporting and security measures:
640 [http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/cyber-incident-reporting-](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/cyber-incident-reporting-in-the-eu)
641 [in-the-eu](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/cyber-incident-reporting-in-the-eu)
- 642 • For the interested reader, ENISA's 2009 paper on incident reporting shows an overview of the situation in
643 the EU 6 years ago: [http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/good-](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting-1)
644 [practice-guide-on-incident-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting-1](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/Incidents-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting/good-practice-guide-on-incident-reporting-1)

645 EU legislation

- 646 • Article 13a of the Framework directive of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications:
647 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0140>
- 648 • The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications (incorporating the Framework Directive
649 including Article 13a):
650 [https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Copy%20of%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Electronic%20Communications%202013%20NO%20CROPS.pdf)
651 [agenda/files/Copy%20of%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Electronic%20Communications%202013](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Copy%20of%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Electronic%20Communications%202013%20NO%20CROPS.pdf)
652 [%20NO%20CROPS.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Copy%20of%20Regulatory%20Framework%20for%20Electronic%20Communications%202013%20NO%20CROPS.pdf)
- 653 • The NIS directive, that also contains incident notification provisions for essential (ESPs) and digital service
654 providers (DSPs): [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC)
655 [content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC)




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